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ABSTRACT 
Cloud computing market forecasts and technology trends confirm 
that Cloud is an IT disrupting phenomena and that the number 
of companies with multi-cloud strategy is continuously growing. 
Cost optimization and increased competitiveness of companies that 
exploit multi-cloud will only be possible when they are able to lever- 
age multiple  cloud offerings, while mastering both the complexity 
of multiple cloud provider management and the protection against 
the higher exposure to attacks that multi-cloud brings. 
This paper presents the MUSA Security modelling language for 
multi-cloud applications which is based on the Cloud Application 
Modelling  and Execution Language (CAMEL) to overcome the lack 
of expressiveness of state-of-the-art  modelling languages towards 
easing: a) the automation of distributed deployment, b) the compu- 
tation of composite Service Level Agreements (SLAs) that include 
security and privacy aspects, and c) the risk analysis and service 
match-making taking into account not only functionality  and busi- 
ness aspects of the cloud services, but also security aspects. The 
paper includes the description of the MUSA Modeller  as the Web 
tool supporting the modelling with the MUSA modelling language. 
The paper introduces  also the MUSA SecDevOps framework in 
which the MUSA Modeller is integrated and with which the MUSA 
Modeller will be validated. 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing forecasts and market estimates of the last years 
confirm that Cloud is an IT disrupting  phenomena with a tremen- 
dous growth potential [5]. According to Gartner [7], by 2020 the 
’Cloud Shift’ (shifting from traditional IT offerings to cloud services) 
will impact more than $1 Trillion in IT spending. 
In the last years the percentage of companies that have a strategy 
to use multiple clouds for running applications or for experimen- 
tation is continuously growing [25]. In such landscape, cost opti- 
mization and increased competitiveness of companies that exploit 
multi-cloud will only be possible when they are able to leverage 
multiple cloud providers offerings, while mastering both the com- 
plexity of multiple cloud provider management and the protection 
against the higher exposure to attacks that multi-cloud brings. 
Multi-cloud applications are those that take most out of the cloud 
by combining multiple cloud offerings, i.e. those which components 
use or are distributed in heterogeneous cloud resources, thus facing 
highly complex challenges with regards to both distributed deploy- 
ment automation  as well as component  and overall application 
security assurance. 
As opposite to cloud federations, in multi-cloud paradigm the 
cloud service providers which services are combined by the user do 
not need necessarily to have previously reached to an agreement 
about the way or model in which the services will be offered. 
Therefore, a number  of problems arise on how to model and 
decide application components distribution in the clouds, as well 
as issues on how to specify security properties offered and required 
(from the cloud providers) by the multi-cloud application individual 
components and the overall application. 
In order to solve these problems, we present a novel approach 
for addressing security in the modelling of multi-cloud applica- 
tions. The formalisms and supporting tool presented herein have 
been developed in the context of the EU-funded MUSA project 
[18]. The solution relies in the extension of the Cloud Application 
Modelling  and Execution Language (CAMEL) [20] to address richer 
deployment requirements specification as well as fully-fledged se- 
curity behaviour specification addressing cases when  application 
components require and provide security capabilities. 
The current state-of-the-art modelling languages lack expressive- 
ness that  eases: a) the automation of distributed deployment, b) the 
computation of composite Service Level Agreements (SLAs) that 
include  security  and privacy  aspects, and c) the risk analysis and 
service match-making taking into account not only functionality 
and business aspects of the cloud services, but also security aspects, 
and this paper addresses such gaps. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 explains 
state-of-the-art  and challenges of multi-cloud application security 
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modelling. In Section 3, we introduce  the MUSA SecDevOps frame- 
work and workflow for multi-cloud applications, which gives the 
context of the work developed. Section 4 details the MUSA Security 
Domain Specific Language and in Section 5 we describe its support- 
ing tool, named MUSA Modeller, included in the MUSA framework. 
Section 6 describes the validation  scenarios of the work presented. 
Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions and future work. 
 
2 MULTI-CLOUD APPLICATION SECURITY 
MODELLING 
In the last years the cloud based infrastructure and platform services 
offering  has increased notably  as well as the number of providers. 
One of the main problems when architecting and operating (multi- 
)cloud applications is that cloud providers support different inter- 
faces for different  sets of services. Furthermore, in order to exploit 
multi-cloud potential, different architectural models can be adopted 
to enlarge security [1]: 
• replication of applications,  deploying  the same system in 
more than one provider so as malicious  attacks can be 
easily discovered comparing operation results; 
• partition of application system into tiers, which allows 
separating logic from data, and thus minimizing risks of 
attacks or incidents in both parts at a time; 
• partition of application logic into fragments in order to 
obfuscate the overall application logic to providers; 
• partition of application data into fragments to prevent a 
single provider reconstructing data, safeguarding confiden- 
tiality. 
Exploiting multi-cloud for higher availability and security means 
that DevOps teams in charge of developing and operating (multi- 
)cloud applications need to learn, systematise and automate the 
process behind the provisioning of services when deploying the 
application components. Among other tasks, they need to learn 
how to create Virtual Machines (VMs) and how to choose the right 
VM sizes for each application  service or component. 
To address these challenges, current  research stakeholders pro- 
pose to take advantage of the well-known Model Driven Engi- 
neering (MDE) techniques to configure the deployment of cloud 
applications. According to the work in [22], application  models can 
be specified using general-purpose languages like the Unified Mod- 
elling Language (UML) [8]. However, to fully unfold the potential 
of MDE, models are frequently specified using domain-specific lan- 
guages (DSLs), which are tailored to a specific domain of concern. 
The MDE techniques become really interesting  for multi-cloud 
application specification when the model captures multi-concern 
information, expressed at high level first and detailed at low level 
application platform afterwards, and when the model is enacted at 
runtime. This allows for a seamless alignment of design decisions 
with actual deployment and application execution.  In this line 
work CloudML [28] and CAMEL [22] (which includes CloudML as 
Deployment model for expressing deployment  needs) languages. 
CAMEL  was developed as part of the research work in PaaSage 
[19] and CloudSocket [17] EU-funded projects. 
Another great exponent in the literature on cloud-based applica- 
tions modelling is the Topology and Orchestration Specification for 
Cloud Applications  (TOSCA) language developed by OASIS [15] 
which provides a language for specifying the components com- 
prising the topology of cloud-based applications along with the 
processes for their orchestration. Another example is the Cloud 
Application Modelling Language (CAML) defined in the ARTIST 
project [16] which realised CloudML as a UML internal  DSL based 
on extensions to the deployment meta-model in terms of a library 
and profiles capturing domain knowledge. 
Following  a similar approach of that of PaaSage Security DSL 
[14], in MUSA project [4] that contextualises the work presented 
in this paper, CAMEL has been adopted in order to cope with the 
modelling of multi-cloud applications. 
CAMEL includes two main security-oriented  meta-models [22]: 
the Security meta-model to support the specification of security 
requirements posed by users and capabilities of cloud providers (in 
form of security controls and service level objectives) and the Or- 
ganisation meta-model that captures security-oriented  information 
about organisations including organisation security policies, users 
and roles. 
The application requirements in CAMEL are mainly captured 
by the Requirements meta-model.  Thus, both the Security and the 
Requirements meta-models can complementarily capture security 
requirements. CAMEL offers support to the following tasks [22]: 
(i) matching in deployment  phase security capabilities and require- 
ments of the application to the security controls offered by the 
cloud providers; (ii) monitoring and assessing security  service level 
objectives (SLOs) which  can be mapped to adaptation rules in order 
to adapt the structure or behaviour of an application to exhibit the 
security level required. 
Although both PaaSage and MUSA projects offer support to both 
tasks, they differ in the modelling aspects, mainly  because PaaSage 
relies on CAMEL model enactment and MUSA follows a different 
approach  as explained  in Section 3.  The rationale for selecting 
CAMEL in our approach on top of other versions of CloudML and 
TOSCA is described in Section 4.1. 
 
3 THE MUSA SECDEVOPS FRAMEWORK FOR 
MULTI-CLOUD APPLICATIONS 
3.1   The MUSA framework 
Multi-cloud solutions pose new challenges when trying to add value 
to overall cloud client experience [29]. 
The MUSA framework [26] introduced in this paper aims at 
ensuring that the desired security and privacy levels are reached in 
all types of multi-cloud environments, including those that combine 
multiple architectural  scenarios as described  in Section 2. 
To this aim, the MUSA framework combines preventive security 
with reactive security. For prevention, the MUSA framework sup- 
ports Security by Design practices in the development  as well as 
embedding in the application the required security mechanisms, 
the so called MUSA Enforcement Agents, which will enable the self- 
healing of the application in operation. For reaction, the MUSA 
framework includes monitoring of the application at runtime to 
detect, notify and early mitigate security incidents, so multi-cloud 
application providers can be informed and promptly  react to secu- 
rity problems or attacks. 
In order to ensure the preventive security mechanisms to be 
embedded in the application components and aligned with reactive 
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Figure 1: MUSA approach and framework tools. 
 
 
 
security  measures, MUSA holistic framework  offers a number of 
mechanisms and supporting tools that seamlessly work together 
along all phases of the application lifecycle, as shown in Fig 1. 
 
3.2   The MUSA workflow 
The MUSA framework  is intended to provide integrated support to 
addressing security  aspects of multi-cloud applications in all the 
steps of the engineering  lifecycle, as illustrated in the process of 
Fig 2. 
During the design phase, the DevOps team first models the Cloud 
Provider Independent Model (CPIM) of the multi-cloud application 
using the MUSA Modeller. The CPIM is a MUSA extended CAMEL 
model specification of the multi-cloud application in a level of 
abstraction independent from specific information about the Cloud 
Service Providers  (CSP) the application components will use or be 
deployed in. 
Once the application CPIM is specified, the DevOps team obtains 
the security requirements in the risk assessment step. In this step, 
together with the security requirements, the DevOps team can 
analyse other criteria as well, such as business criteria, and can 
search for the cloud services that best match all the criteria, by 
relying on the use of the MUSA Decision Support Tool (DST) [4]. 
Modelling, risk analysis and cloud services selection are made 
following an iterative process that allows identifying which security 
requirements (if any) were not possible to address with security 
controls offered by the cloud services under study, and therefore 
the DevOps team can update the CPIM at modelling step to specify 
the use of MUSA security agents that offer the pending security 
controls (if available). 
Having selected the combination of cloud services that best 
match the requirements of the multi-cloud application and having 
previously defined the security requirements, the DevOps team 
can generate the Security SLA templates for the components of 
the multi-cloud application. These Security SLA templates will be 
stored in the SLA Repository and will be retrieved by the MUSA 
Deployer, so it can generate the Implementation plan for the multi- 
cloud application. Once the Implementation  plan is generated, the 
MUSA Deployer shares it with the SLA Generator [2], so this tool 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: MUSA overall process. 
 
 
can generate the Composite Security SLA for the whole multi-cloud 
application. 
Afterwards,  at deployment phase, the MUSA Deployer is invoked 
by the DevOps team in order to deploy (by following the Imple- 
mentation plan) both the multi-cloud  application components and 
the corresponding MUSA agents declared in the CPIM. 
Finally, at runtime or operation  phase, the MUSA  Security Assur- 
ance platform [27] starts monitoring the multi-cloud application 
based on the final SLAs and the Implementation  plan. 
If the MUSA Security Assurance Platform detects any alert event 
or violation of the SLAs in place, it notifies to the DevOps team 
and the appropriate reactive measure is triggered. The reaction to 
security incidents in MUSA relies on different mechanisms depend- 
ing on the cause of the incident. Reactive measures include the 
re-deployment of multi-cloud  application component(s) or even the 
application re-design. In the re-design phase the need of including 
MUSA Enforcement Agents can be evaluated again in order to try 
to address the security incident detected. Adaptation of multi-cloud 
applications at execution is supported in MUSA by the enforcement 
services in the MUSA Security Assurance Platform, that remotely 
control the configuration, activation and deactivation of some of 
the MUSA Enforcement Agents. We refer to future publications of 
MUSA for detailed explanation of the enforcement services offered. 
 
4   MUSA SECURITY DSL 
The MUSA Security Domain Specific Language (DSL) builds on top 
of the CAMEL language and the main contributions  are related to 
its expressiveness to define and configure multi-cloud applications 
at design-time. Such a powerful  definition can be used later on by 
other MUSA tools to perform the risk analysis and to generate the 
individual components’  security  SLAs and the Composite Security 
SLA. Furthermore,  this allows deploying and monitoring the secu- 
rity properties of multi-cloud applications and its components at 
run-time. In brief, the main innovations achieved in MUSA are the 
improvements to the CAMEL language, the accompanying model 
syntax and semantics verification rules, and the development of a 
Web-based modelling  tool (named MUSA Modeller)  as explained in 
the following. The MUSA Security DSL is shown in Fig 3. 
 
4.1   Rationale for CAMEL language selection 
The main reasons for selecting CAMEL  language as the basis of the 
MUSA security DSL are explained in the following. 
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Figure 3: MUSA Security DSL. 
 
 
First, the enactment of the multi-cloud application model at 
runtime is not needed in MUSA. This is because in MUSA we do 
not rely on a single model of the multi-cloud application to capture 
all the aspects, but on a number of models. In MUSA we use the 
CAMEL model of the application to express its architecture,  security 
and deployment requirements, but in addition we use: Security 
SLA templates of the components to capture the required security 
features over the cloud providers,  and the Composite Security SLA 
to express the guarantees of the overall application.  The Composite 
Security SLA serves in MUSA to control the application behaviour 
at runtime. Multi-cloud applications re-designs will be driven by 
actual measurements taken of the Service Level Objectives and 
metrics stated in the Composite Security SLA. In MUSA we also use 
the Decision Support Tool data model for expressing business and 
security requirements over the cloud providers, and the deployment 
Implementation plan as the cloud platform dependent deployment 
model. 
Second, CAMEL  includes CloudML  as Deployment meta-model, 
therefore, adopting it implies adopting CloudML too.   Besides, 
CAMEL  includes also other meta-models such as Security and Re- 
quirements meta-models that are valuable when placing the focus 
on security.  CAMEL  follows  the same approach that CloudML in re- 
lation to the provision of a single set of abstractions  and APIs so that 
developers can define declaratively:  (i) the application architecture 
made of components, (ii) their use/host relationships so that they 
can be properly configured and deployment orders automatically 
derived, (iii) constraints on the characteristics of the required types 
of VMs and (iv) the execution commands to provision application 
components. 
At this point, it is important to note that MUSA project was 
born with the objective of supporting cloud adoption by addressing 
current security open issues, since companies are reluctant to adopt 
cloud computing because of the difficulty in evaluating the trade- 
off between cloud benefits and the additional security risks and 
privacy  issues it may bring. They have to deal with the security of 
the individual components  as well as with the overall application 
security including the communications and the data flow between 
the components. Therefore, it is required to adopt a language that 
allows end-users to friendly and easily create and deploy security- 
aware components balancing security with performance properties. 
As opposite to PaaSage approach, where the low level security in- 
formation is captured in the CAMEL  based Cloud Provider  Specific 
Model (CPSM), in MUSA it is captured and managed by two other 
specialised languages, respectively, the MUSA Security SLA model 
(extended from that of SPECS project [23] to address multi-cloud 
scenarios) and the MUSA Decision Support Tool’s Cloud Service 
Provider data model that allows defining full flavoured  business 
and security requirements and capabilities for multi-factor service 
match-making. 
Third, opposite to TOSCA, MUSA end-users had already experi- 
enced with CAMEL and liked the language expressiveness because 
it was the only language that already provided rich Security model 
and Requirements model (for deployment). CAMEL and TOSCA 
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basically share the same purpose, but CAMEL results in being less 
complex and easy to use. 
Furthermore, TOSCA community did not offer advanced tool 
support at the time when MUSA solution was defined. 
Last but not least, the feedback received from the MUSA project 
end-users about previous experiences with multi-cloud modelling 
languages and tools was considered as fundamental.  One of the 
end-user teams had experienced with CAMEL and liked the ex- 
pressiveness of the language for multi-cloud application descrip- 
tion, although  security  aspects were not considered by them previ- 
ously. About the modelling tools, they had previously used PaaSage 
CAMEL Textual Editor [21] and other graphical  editors (such as 
Modelio [3]) and preferred the non-graphical editor that included 
friendly functionality such as identification of required vs. optional 
attributes, auto completion capabilities and model validation among 
others. Thus, these are exactly the features we aim to maintain in 
the MUSA Modeller. As conceptually both graphical and textual 
editors allow for the same degree of detail and completeness, we 
decided to develop our MUSA Modeller  as a text editor. 
 
4.2 Innovations for security behaviour 
specifications 
The MUSA innovations  to CAMEL language include the enhanced 
component security behaviour characterization, which addresses 
concepts required to support both composition of components’ 
security SLAs and risk analysis. 
 
4.2.1   Classification  of components by their nature which allows 
describing what the component does. This information is required 
by the MUSA SLA Generator to create the Composite Security SLA 
of the multi-cloud application from individual components’ SLAs 
and by the MUSA Risk Analysis tool in order to identify the secu- 
rity threats and risks at component level. Our CAMEL extension 
allows specifying the type of the component; in fact, the compo- 
nent can be classified by two features: WHAT and HOW. While 
WHAT indicates the type of the functionality  delivered by the com- 
ponent, HOW indicates the way the component is delivering such 
functionality. Currently, three types of HOW have been defined: 
• COTS, which refers to Commercial off-the-shelf software 
that the application uses. 
• SERVICE, meaning that the component  is not a commercial 
package but developed by the DevOps team responsible 
for the multi-cloud application engineering. 
• AGENT, i.e. a MUSA Agent component provided by the 
MUSA framework and available in the MUSA Security 
Agent Catalogue. 
The types of WHAT include: 
• in case the component is COTS or SERVICE, the possible 
WHAT values are: Web, Storage, IDM or Firewall. Web 
refers to any functionality provided through a Web inter- 
face, Storage refers to data storage solutions (e.g. MySQL), 
IDM stays for Identity Management and Firewall for any 
software solution that protects resources from unautho- 
rised access. 
• in case the component is AGENT, the possible values of 
WHAT come from the list of the agents in the MUSA Secu- 
rity Agent Catalogue. 
 
4.2.2    Security Controls information  that properly  supports Se- 
curity Control Framework families. For example, name attribute  has 
been updated to <Family>-<Number>(Number) format. In addi- 
tion, the subdomain attribute in the Security Control entity now is 
optional instead of compulsory. 
The CAMEL extension developed in MUSA allows specifying 
which security capabilities are required and provided by each multi- 
cloud application component. The security capabilities are defined 
in the model by selecting and grouping the security controls part 
of the capability. The security controls of a Security Control Fam- 
ily are predefined and the list is offered to the user by the MUSA 
Modeller to ease the selection of the ones included in the capability; 
currently, the security controls from the NIST SP 800-53 rev.4 [6] 
are supported. In the following example two security capabilities 
CAP1 and CAP2 are defined, the first with three security controls 
and the second with only two. 
 
security model   SEC { 
security capability CAP1 { 
controls [MUSASEC.AC-11(1),  MUSASEC.AU-13(2), 
MUSASEC.AC-17(6)] 
} 
security capability CAP2 { 
controls [MUSASEC.AC-11(1),  MUSASEC.AC-17(6)] 
} 
} 
 
Once the security capabilities are defined in the CAMEL (in 
the security model part of the model), the user can specify what 
security capabilities the components require and/or provide. In 
the following example, Comp1Cap is a provided capability and 
Comp1CapReq  a requested one. 
 
provided security capability  Comp1Cap { 
security capability SEC.CAP2 
} 
required security capability  Comp1CapReq 
 
When a component requires a specific security capability from 
another component (in the example, Comp1CapReq) then the match- 
ing of the capability  needs to be modelled  as follows. 
 
capability match   Comp1ToComp2  { 
from Comp1.Comp1CapReq to Comp2.Comp2Cap 
} 
 
 
4.3 Innovations for multi-cloud deployment 
Other MUSA innovations to CAMEL language address improve- 
ments for enhancing the expressiveness of the deployment require- 
ments, as follows: 
 
4.3.1    Explicit characterization of the nature of the IP address 
associated with virtual machines ponents will be deployed.  At de- 
ployment phase, when acquiring  new cloud resources such as VMs, 
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the system operator  needs to indicate whether  a public IP address is 
required. The CAMEL extension allows specifying whether the IP 
address required for a VM should be public or not by the IP public 
attribute  on each component. The possible values for this attribute 
are: true or false. 
 
4.3.2   Specification  of the deployment order of the application 
components. Dealing with multi-cloud environments, it is critical 
to identify the order in which each component should be deployed 
and configured, since there are inter-dependencies among the com- 
ponents that are part of the same application.  For example, the start 
up of a component may require that previously another component 
is already up and running.  The CAMEL extension allows specifying 
the order in which the components are required to be deployed. 
This can be done by using the order attribute for each component. 
The expected value for the order attribute is an integer number. 
 
4.3.3   Explicit definition of data exchange protocols.  In the MUSA 
extended CAMEL, users can model the communications between 
the components  (e.g. by setting the IP addresses and ports in the 
configuration of the components) and specify the need to use a 
specific data exchange protocol (e.g. MySQL, OAuth, Other). 
 
4.3.4   Modelling  of dynamic configurations of communications 
between components.  In CAMEL, users model the communications 
between the components in a static way (i.e. through specific port 
numbers and operating system configuration  variables). However, 
in MUSA, dynamic characteristics have been introduced  such as 
context paths (instead of IP addresses) and dynamic  port ranges. 
Such new capabilities are useful, for instance, to configure explicitly 
inbound traffic when users deploy components in Docker contain- 
ers. 
 
4.3.5   Modelling  of deployment handlers. In CAMEL the user 
can model components and associate deployment instructions for 
installing, configuring, starting, and stopping the components on 
virtual machines. However, such deployment instructions are re- 
stricted to scripted commands and CAMEL lacks support to the 
specification of configuration  management tools such as Cloudify 
[12], Puppet [24], or Chef [9]. Therefore, in MUSA this gap between 
multi-cloud application  models and these advanced frameworks 
has been faced via the new Configuration entity and its associated 
concepts (e.g. cookbooks and recipes in case of Chef ). 
 
4.3.6   Modelling  of PaaS layer elements. CAMEL lacks support 
to the description of architectures where the application compo- 
nents are not directly deployed in Virtual Machines (VMs) but in 
containers. Our extension allows specifying the container type that 
will be used in deployment and defining the component allocation 
strategy it should follow, even in cases when the container uses 
VM pools. The new elements in our extension include: 
• pool:  is a cluster of VMs. This cluster can be used by 
a container  or directly by a component,  for example,  a 
database solution  that is capable of managing  a cluster. 
• manager : the VM in a pool that will act as the manager vs. 
the rest which will be workers. 
• container : 
– type: the container solution to use, for example, Docker 
Swarm [10]. 
– allocationStrategy: defines the allocation strategy of 
the containers on top of the acquired VMs for resource 
optimization (e.g. automatically scheduling container 
workloads). It supports the following four values: 
∗ spread: balance containers  across the VMs in a 
pool based on the available CPU and RAM of 
the VMs. 
∗  binpak: schedule containers to fully use each 
VM capacity.  Once the full VM capacity has 
been used, the container moves on to the next 
one in the pool. 
∗ random:  choose a VM randomly. 
∗ custom:   the user defines the specific VMs in 
which the containers should run. 
 
4.3.7   Refinement  of security aspects in Organisation,  User, Cre- 
dentials and Role entities. A number of enhancements to CAMEL 
have been made in order to manage the authorisation  of different 
roles in the DevOps team to multi-cloud application deployment 
execution. For instance, in MUSA the types of credentials available 
to authenticate a user have been extended. Among other changes, 
it has been added expiration  date to Credentials and additional 
parameter properties to User entity. 
 
4.4 Innovations for self-healing capability of 
multi-cloud applications 
Considering  self-healing  as the capability  of a multi-cloud applica- 
tion of being able to self-control or modify its security behaviour 
at runtime  so as security  incidents  or attacks are corrected or miti- 
gated, the self-healing is enabled in MUSA by the MUSA Enforce- 
ment Agents. 
As their name suggests, the MUSA Enforcement  Agents enforce 
multi-cloud application security properties at runtime such as ac- 
cess control, security vulnerability scanning or Denial of service 
mitigation mechanisms. For these mechanisms to work, they need 
to be deployed  at the same time as the application components 
are deployed.  Some of these mechanisms require to be deployed 
together with (in the same VM) the component they will enforce 
the property on. Therefore, the MUSA extended CAMEL allows 
the definition of MUSA Security Enforcement  Agents as Internal 
Components of the application, similarly to application compo- 
nents themselves, so as they can be included  in the deployment 
plan. Such agents are already pre-defined in the MUSA Security 
Agent Catalogue so users are able to re-use and configure them in a 
friendly way. Some of these agents are always on and some will be 
managed through the enforcement services in the MUSA Security 
Assurance Platform. 
 
5   MUSA MODELLER 
5.1   MUSA Modeller Architecture 
The MUSA Modeller is a web editor tool that allows the creation 
and maintenance of (MUSA extended) CAMEL models. Through 
these models it is possible to define a complete specification  of the 
requirements needed by an application to be deployed in a secure 
multi-cloud environment. MUSA Modeller has leveraged one of 
the new capabilities of the Xtext technology [11]: the Xtext Web 
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editor support. Therefore, multi-cloud application models can be 
edited and updated remotely by end-users while they are stored 
in shared repositories. All in all, without any program installation 
and using any web browser since its JavaScript-based API allows 
adding language-specific  features such as auto completion and live 
validation. 
As the initial step of the design phase, the DevOps team creates 
the Cloud Provider Independent Model (CPIM) of the multi-cloud 
application using the MUSA Modeller tool. The generated CPIM 
will be used as input to the risk assessment, the SLA generation 
and the multi-cloud application deployment processes. 
At high level, the MUSA Modeller is structured as follows: 
• A Web component, the GUI from which the end-users ac- 
cess the MUSA Modeller tool and exploit all the internal 
web-services offered.  It also includes the web Xtext li- 
braries that offer syntactic and sematic services for remote 
management of syntax validation and auto completion. 
• A Server component, which is the core of the MUSA Mod- 
eller since it implements all the business functionality. 
Moreover, it offers a series of web services that are con- 
sumed by the Web component. 
• A Database component, which manages all the data stored 
in the central database. It uses the Hibernate framework 
[13] that allows the abstraction of relational database en- 
gines. 
 
5.2   MUSA Modeller API 
As explained in the previous chapter, the Server component of the 
MUSA Modeller offers a series of REST API interfaces that support 
the following functionality: 
• Creation of a new multi-cloud application model in (MUSA 
extended) CAMEL language. End-users can instantiate pre- 
viously defined templates for particular component types 
or applications. 
• Definition and storage of multi-cloud application compo- 
nent templates for reusing CAMEL models of the compo- 
nents. 
• Edition and storage of multi-cloud application models, 
where application models can be defined by multiple end- 
users. 
• Model checking for syntax and semantic correctness and 
integrity of the created models. The tool provides mes- 
sages of warnings and errors whenever a non-conformity 
is identified in the model. 
• the selection of Security Controls previously identified 
and stored in the MUSA Security Service Level Agreement 
Catalogue. 
• the selection of MUSA Security Enforcement Agents pre- 
viously identified and stored in the MUSA Security Agent 
Catalogue. See Fig 4. 
 
6   VALIDATION IN USE CASES 
During the first period of the MUSA project, the evaluation of the 
MUSA solution  has been performed  using generic usage scenarios 
along with two specific  use cases, one led by Lufthansa Systems 
(LHS) and the other by Tampere University of Technology (TUT), 
 
 
Figure 4: MUSA Modeller support for Security Agent selec- 
tion. 
 
 
 
both partners of the project.  These case studies have been designed 
to ensure that MUSA framework evaluation takes place in different 
contexts of multi-cloud deployment as well as diverse security  and 
privacy requirements. 
The first use case is related to the flight scheduling application 
prototype by Lufthansa Systems that is intended to be used by 
multiple airlines around the world to plan airplane flight sched- 
ules. Today’s airlines need to permanently revise their schedule 
plans in response to competitor actions or to follow updated sales 
and marketing plans, while constantly maintaining operational in- 
tegrity. This makes schedule management a very complex process. 
The MUSA Modeller enabled LHS to specify the breakdown of the 
multi-cloud application into its components  as well as components’ 
security capabilities. This includes also the integration  of the MUSA 
security agents into the application and the design of the provi- 
sioning and deployment. LHS has validated the MUSA Modeller to 
help architects and developers of the multi-cloud application com- 
ponents in the security design to gain more focus on the complex 
field of security requirements analysis and enforcing the security 
by design principles even for the less experienced colleagues. 
In the second use case, the Smart Mobility application developed 
by Tampere University of Technology provides Tampere citizens 
context-aware energy efficient smart mobility services and recom- 
mendations for transportation means. This case study  represents 
the scenario of SMEs which create applications that exploit services 
hosted in a number of clouds. As many SMEs, the workgroup that 
develops this case study does not have a specialized division for 
cyber security.  Because of this, the use of MUSA framework and 
its tools has allowed easily addressing security  aspects at different 
stages of the application engineering project: design, deployment 
and runtime. 
Specifically, in this case study the MUSA Modeller tool has been 
evaluated to model the multi-cloud application components and 
MUSA Enforcement Agents to integrate security controls for high 
availability, confidentiality and integrity. 
The added value of the MUSA modelling language and tool has 
been already identified  in the initial evaluation performed in both 
case studies. The usefulness  and acceptance of the approach was 
ARES ’17, August  29-September 01, 2017, Reggio Calabria,  Italy E.Rios et al.  
 
confirmed not only in the usage of the MUSA Modeller  as a stand- 
alone tool, but more significantly in its integration with the rest of 
the tools in the MUSA Security DevOps (SecDevOps) framework, 
particularly in collaboration with Risk Analysis, SLA Generator 
and Deployer tools. It is expected that the final evaluation of the 
MUSA solution will enable the validation  of all the enhancements 
defined in the MUSA Security DSL. 
 
7   CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
As the number of cloud offerings grows and cloud environments 
become more and more complex, cloud consumers will need to face 
multi-cloud challenges related to multiple cloud service combina- 
tion and holistic protection of application components deployed in 
distributed heterogeneous clouds. 
This paper presents a novel modelling language and support- 
ing tool that address the special needs of multi-cloud applications 
modelling. The solution overcomes the lack of expressiveness of 
state-of-the-art modelling by easing both: a) the computation of 
Composite Security SLAs that include security and privacy aspects, 
and b) the risk analysis and service match-making taking into ac- 
count not only functionality and business aspects of the cloud 
services, but also security aspects. 
The language and tool presented were developed in the context 
of the MUSA EU-funded project on the basis of enhancements to 
the CAMEL language which already provided rich Requirements, 
Deployment, Scalability, and Security meta-models that cover many 
of the requirements for multi-cloud applications specification. Nev- 
ertheless, additional requirements were identified in MUSA in order 
to address richer deployment  and security specification,  risk analy- 
sis and Security SLA composition, for which extensions to CAMEL 
have been developed. The modelling  tool supporting this extended 
CAMEL meta-model, the MUSA Modeller, is already integrated 
with the MUSA framework and available in the MUSA website at 
www.musa-project.eu 
Consequently, the contributions of this paper pave the way to 
develop security and privacy-aware multi-cloud applications by 
mastering the expressiveness of security  aspects in the CPIM so as 
they enable integrated  SecDevOps support. 
In the future, we have identified the need to research on how to 
leverage the Scalability meta-model of CAMEL to define scalability 
rules as pre-defined configuration of high availability enforcement 
agents aimed at scaling up (and down) internal components of 
multi-cloud applications when needed (similar  to HA Proxy [30]). 
Another important aspect is the research on how to support 
composability of CAMEL models required to easily combine and 
refer to CAMEL models of individual  components in the creation of 
multi-cloud  applications’ models. Furthermore, this would largely 
increase the models readability and dramatically  improve the tool 
usability. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The MUSA project leading to this paper has received funding from 
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation pro- 
gramme under grant  agreement  No 644429. We would also like to 
acknowledge all the members of the MUSA Consortium for their 
valuable help. 
REFERENCES 
[1]  Jens-Matthias Bohli, Nils Gruschka, Meiko Jensen, Luigi Lo Iacono, and Ninja 
Marnau. 2013. Security and privacy-enhancing  multicloud  architectures. IEEE 
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing  10, 4 (2013), 212–224. 
[2]  Valentina Casola, Alessandra De Benedictis, Massimiliano  Rak, and Erkuden 
Rios. 2016. Security-by-design in clouds: a security-SLA driven methodology to 
build secure cloud applications.  Procedia Computer Science 97 (2016), 53–62. 
[3]  Inc. Eclipse Foundation. 2011. Modelio, The open source modelling environment. 
(2011). Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from https://www.modelio.org/ 
[4]  Jaume Ferrarons, Smrati Gupta, Victor Munte´s-Mulero,  Josep-Lluis Larriba-Pey, 
and Peter Matthews. 2016. Scoring cloud services through digital ecosystem 
community  analysis. In International Conference on Electronic Commerce and Web 
Technologies. Springer,  142–153. 
[5]  Forbes.     2016.              Roundup   Of    Cloud    Computing    Forecasts 
And   Market   Estimates.         (2016).         Retrieved    June  26,   2017 
from           https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2016/03/13/ 
roundup- of- cloud- computing- forecasts- and- market- estimates- 2016/ 
#7971c3de2187 
[6]  JOINT TASK FORCE and TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE. 2013. Security and 
privacy controls for federal information  systems and organizations.  NIST Special 
Publication  800, 53 (2013), 8–13. 
[7]  Gartner. 2016. Gartner  Says by 2020 ”Cloud Shift” Will Affect More Than $1 
Trillion in IT Spending.  (2016). Retrieved June 26, 2017 from http://www.gartner. 
com/newsroom/id/3384720 
[8]  Object Management Group. 2015. Unified Modeling Language Specification v2.5. 
(2015). Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from http://www.omg.org/spec/UML/2.5/ 
[9]  Chef Software Inc. 2017. Chef technology.  (2017). Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from 
https://www.chef.io/chef/ 
[10]  Docker Inc. 2017. Docker Swarm.  (2017). Retrieved June 26, 2017 from https: 
//docs.docker.com/swarm/ 
[11]  Eclipse Foundation Inc. 2017. Xtext framework.  (2017). Retrieved  June 26, 2017 
from http://www.eclipse.org/Xtext/documentation/330 web support.html 
[12]  GigaSpaces Technologies  Inc. 2017. Cloudify. (2017). Retrieved  June 26, 2017 
from http://cloudify.co/ 
[13]  Red Hat Inc. 2017. Hibernate framework.  (2017). Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from 
http://hibernate.org/ 
[14]  Kyriakos Kritikos and Philippe Massonet. 2016. An integrated meta-model for 
cloud application security modelling. Procedia Computer Science 97 (2016), 84–93. 
[15]  OASIS. 2013. TOSCA 1.0 (Topology and Orchestration Specification for Cloud 
Applications), Version 1.0.  (2013).  Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from http://docs. 
oasis- open.org/tosca/TOSCA/v1.0/os/TOSCA- v1.0- os.html 
[16]  ARTIST EU project consortium. 2013. Advanced software-based service provi- 
sioning and migration of legacy software.  (2013). Retrieved June 26, 2017 from 
http://www.artist- project.eu 
[17]  CloudSocket EU project consortium.  2015. Business and IT-Cloud  Alignment 
using a Smart Socket. (2015). Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from https://site.cloudsocket. 
eu 
[18]  MUSA EU project consortium. 2015. Multi-cloud Secure Applications. (2015). 
Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from http://www.musa- project.eu 
[19]  PaaSage EU project consortium. 2013. A Model-based Cross-Cloud development 
and deployment platform. (2013).  Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from http://www. 
paasage.eu 
[20]  PaaSage EU project consortium.  2014. Deliverable  D2.1.2 CloudML Implementa- 
tion Documentation. (2014). Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from http://www.paasage. 
eu/images/documents/paasage  d2.1.2 final.pdf 
[21]  PaaSage EU project consortium. 2015. Deliverable  D2.1.3 CAMEL Documentation. 
(2015). Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from https://www.paasage.eu/images/documents/ 
docs/D2.1.3 CAMEL Documentation.pdf 
[22]  PaaSage EU project consortium. 2016. CAMEL Documentation  v2015.9. (2016). 
Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from http://camel- dsl.org/documentation/ 
[23]  SPECS EU project consortium. 2015. Secure Provisioning  of Cloud Services 
based on SLA Management.  (2015). Retrieved June 26, 2017 from http://www. 
specs- project.eu/ 
[24]  Puppet. 2017. Puppet documentation. (2017).  Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from 
https://docs.puppet.com/puppet/ 
[25]  Rightscale.  2017.    Cloud Computing Trends:  2017 State of  the Cloud 
Survey.     (2017).  http://www.rightscale.com/blog/cloud- industry- insights/ 
cloud- computing- trends- 2017- state- cloud- survey 
[26]  Erkuden Rios, Eider Iturbe, Leire Orue-Echevarria, Massimiliano Rak, Valentina 
Casola, and others. 2015. Towards Self-Protective Multi-Cloud Applications: 
MUSA–a Holistic Framework to Support the Security-Intelligent Lifecycle Man- 
agement of Multi-Cloud Applications. (2015). 
[27]  Erkuden Rios, Wissam Mallouli,  Massimiliano  Rak, Valentina Casola, and Anto- 
nio M Ortiz. 2016. SLA-driven monitoring of multi-cloud application components 
using the MUSA framework. In Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICD- 
CSW), 2016 IEEE 36th International Conference on. IEEE, 55–60. 
Self-healing Multi-Cloud Application Modelling ARES ’17, August  29-September 01, 2017, Reggio Calabria,  Italy  
 
 
[28]  SINTEF. 2013. Model-based provisioning and deployment of cloud-based systems. 
(2013). Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from http://cloudml.org 
[29]  Marko Vukolic´. 2010. The Byzantine empire in the intercloud. ACM SIGACT 
News 41, 3 (2010), 105–111. 
[30]  Q HAProxy Wu. 2017. The Reliable, High Performance TCP/HTTP Load Balancer. 
(2017). Retrieved  June 26, 2017 from http://www.haproxy.org/ 
